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Labor Violations in Mexico: Can New
Trade Agreements Effectuate Change?
Nicole Downey Moss*
Child labor and forced labor remain pervasive problems on
Mexican farms. Millions of workers on these farms are
forced to work and live in inhumane conditions, only to leave
the season’s harvest just as poor as they were before. To
date, human rights and labor treaties and agreements that
Mexico is party to have failed to protect workers. In early
2016, however, negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) concluded and, if ratified, the party-countries
claim that the TPP will hold Mexico to higher standards than
previously faced because the TPP will link labor rights with
trade law. However, this was the hope when Mexico, Canada, and the United States placed the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) into force as well. This article
will therefore analyze whether the TPP is indeed an improvement on NAFTA and, if so, whether the TPP will work
to effectively enforce Mexican labor rights. This article begins with a look at the violations occurring on the farms, followed by a summary of the international human rights laws,
international labor laws, and international trade laws that
Mexico is already party to. The article also includes an indepth summary of the labor side-agreement to NAFTA, the
*
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Central Florida in 2014 and will graduate from the University of Miami School
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North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and how
this side agreement compares to the TPP. Lastly, this article
examines additional efforts that may be made to uphold labor rights on Mexican farms, including a bottom-up approach that involves both laborers and consumers. Accordingly, this article concludes that the TPP does represent a
significant improvement on NAFTA, though it remains to be
seen whether this improvement will itself be enough to effectuate change in Mexico.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
When walking into a local supermarket and seeing a wide selection of fresh fruits and vegetables, it is nearly impossible to imagine
what the “Made in Mexico” sticker on many of those products entails. Though recent investigations have helped to increase awareness, 1 the average consumer typically would not be able to tell that
their store-bought vegetables were picked by a poor Mexican farmworker, who lives in a rat-infested camp, making just $8 to $12 dollars a day, and being beaten if he tries to escape.2 Sifting through red
peppers, in search of the best ones, one likewise would not be aware
that they were picked by small children, who were pulled out of
school and trying to harvest enough to ensure that they would not
die of starvation.3 The United States and Mexico have recently announced collaborative plans to increase the safety of the food we
eat.4 However, the current multilateral agreements concerning the
labor rights of those harvesting that food do little, if anything, to
protect the workers responsible for the production of our food.
Mexico’s Constitution recognizes basic labor rights.5 Additionally, Mexico is a party to North America Free Trade Agreement

1

Richard Marosi, Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, a Bounty for U.S. Tables,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://graphics.latimes.com/product-of-mexico-camps [hereinafter Hardship on Mexico’s Farms].
2
Id. (stating “[m]any farm laborers are essentially trapped for months at a
time in rat-infested camps, often without beds and sometimes without functioning
toilets or a reliable water supply.”).
3
Richard Marosi, In Mexico’s Fields, Children Toil to Harvest Crops That
Make it to American Tables, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 14, 2014), http://graphic
s.latimes.com/product-of-mexico-children/ [hereinafter In Mexico’s Fields].
4
See FDA Builds Closer Ties with Mexico, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct.
16, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm418741.ht
m.
5
See Constitución Politica De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art.
123, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF
2015 (Mex.).
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(NAFTA), which, in part, seeks to enforce basic labor rights.6 However, the Mexican government has proven unable, or unwilling, to
enforce the Constitution’s rights,7 and the agreements that the country is party to lack sufficient enforcement mechanisms.8 This may
soon change, however, if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) goes
into effect.9 The United States government has claimed that, if this
agreement is ratified, labor rights in Mexico, and in other partycountries, will be revitalized.10
The TPP is a proposed multilateral agreement between the
United States and twelve other countries, including Mexico.11 The
TPP requires parties to implement and enforce fundamental labor
rights recognized by the International Labour Organization (ILO), a
specialized agency of the United Nations that is devoted to promoting labor rights.12 These rights include the elimination of forced labor13 and the abolition of child labor.14 The TPP also requires parties
6

See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
7
BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LIST OF GOODS
PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 5 (Dec. 1, 2014), available at htt
p://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/TVPRA_Report2014.pdf (finding that at least
nine products produced in Mexico were produced by child labor) [hereinafter LIST
OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR].
8
For instance, agreements put forth by one of the most established organizations for labor rights, the International Labor Organization, “has no sanctioning
power or other means of enforcing its standards.” See Lance A. Compa, The First
NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 159, 160 (1995).
9
See Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership
[hereinafter TPP].
10
Vivian Dong, Enforcing Labor Standards Under The Trans-Pacific Partnership, ONLABOR (Feb. 29, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/02/29/enforcing-labor-standards-under-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ (quoting the U.S. Trade Representative as stating the TPP has “the strongest protections for workers of any
trade agreement in history”).
11
TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www
.bbc.com/news/business-32498715.
12
Trans-Pacific Partnership art.19.3(1), available at https://www.mfat.govt
.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/19.-Labour-Chapter.pdf
(last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
13
Id. at art. 19.3(1)(b).
14
Id. at art. 19.3(1)(c).
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to commit to have laws governing standards such as minimum wage
and hours of work.15 In the event of a violation of a labor provision,
the TPP includes dispute settlement procedures, including possible
trade sanctions.16Additionally, under the TPP, the United States has
negotiated bilateral implementation plans to ensure that specific
countries are conforming to the agreement’s commitments.17 These
plans currently involve Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam;18 however, a parallel plan is currently being negotiated with
Mexico.19
This article will address Mexican farmworkers’ current lack of
labor rights through a comparative analysis of the mechanisms, in
the form of trade agreements, purportedly in place to counteract
these issues. Part II of this article will explain how the workers fall
into this exploitation and will address their grievances. Part III will
analyze the relevant existing international law, including international human rights law, labor law, and global trade law. This section will also briefly address the dispute resolution mechanisms in
place within the current agreements in order to provide a background on how they compare to the mechanisms within the TPP.
Part IV of this piece will thoroughly analyze the effect of trade liberalization, in the form of NAFTA and the TPP, on the rights of
Mexican farmworkers and the enforcement mechanisms in place to
ensure that the workers’ rights are protected. Finally, Part V will
address recommendations for future improvement of these working
conditions as well as the third-party mechanisms available to enforce abidance with basic labor rights.

15

Id. at art. 19.3(2).
See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership art.28, available at https://www.m
fat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.-Dispute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
17
Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OAS (Oct. 5, 2015), http://ww
w.sice.oas.org/TPD/TPP/Negotiations/Summary_TPP_October_2015_e.pdf.
18
Id.
19
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP MADE IN AMERICA, https://ustr.gov/s
ites/default/files/TPP-Protecting-Workers-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2017).
16
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BACKGROUND

A.
Falling Into the Trap: How and Why Laborers Begin
Working on the Farms
As of 2012, there were almost 168 million children involved in
child labor20 and 20.9 million persons involved in forced labor.21
Additionally, in 2014, more than 59 types of agricultural goods
(fruits and vegetables) were produced by child labor, meaning produced by children under the age of 15.22 Furthermore, over 27 types
of agricultural goods were also produced using forced labor.23 In
Mexico specifically, foods such as chili peppers, cucumbers, eggplants, green beans, and tomatoes have been identified as having
been produced using child or forced labor.24 While exact percentages of goods produced using these types of labor are not available,
the United States Department of Labor stated that these findings reflected “significant incidences of child labor or forced labor” occurring worldwide.25
Approximately 14.3 percent of Mexico’s population (an estimated 17 million individuals) is employed in agriculture.26 Of those
17 million individuals, three million engage in internal migrant farm
work.27 These workers leave impoverished communities in indigenous Mexican states, such as Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and Veracruz, to
seek an escape from poverty.28 The workers are enticed to join labor
20
LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR, supra
note 7, at 1.
21
Questions and Answers on Forced Labour, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION (June 1, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_181922/lang--en/index.htm.
22
LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR, supra
note 7, at 6.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 5.
25
Id. at 20.
26
Mexico: National Socio-Demographic Profile, ECONOMIC COMM’N OF
LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN, (2017), http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/P
erfil_Nacional_Social.html?pais=MEX&idioma=english.
27
Human Rights of Migrants and Other Persons in the Context of Human
Mobility in Mexico, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., Report No. 48/13, OEA/Ser.L/V/II
¶ 69, (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/Report-Migrants-Mexico-2013.pdf. [hereinafter Human Rights of Migrants Report]
28
Id.
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camps through endless advertisements, blaring through storefront
speakers, portraying favorable conditions such as three free meals
and 100 pesos per day, as well as a solid roof over their head.29 Desperate to improve their current conditions, men, women, and children gather outside and meet with a labor contractor, who transports
them to the farms where they will live for the next few months.30 In
addition to the three million workers who have already internally
migrated to labor on farms, it is estimated that approximately
150,00031 new, hopeful workers make this dangerous trip32 every
harvest season, traveling by bus, train, or even walking.33 Once they
arrive at the farms, the workers quickly realize that surviving the
treacherous journey was just the beginning.
In Mexico, farms using these exploitative forms of labor export
their products to major American brands, such as Whole Foods and
Wal-Mart.34 For instance, the farm Agricola San Emilio, in Sinaloa,
exports to Andrew & Williamson, an American distribution company located in San Diego.35 The distribution company then provides tomatoes to Darden Restaurants, the owner of popular restaurants such as Olive Garden and Longhorn Steakhouse, and to WalMart.36 Workers at the Agricola San Emilio farm are awoken every
day at 3 a.m. to begin their work. They grab coffee, a biscuit, and a
few tortillas and head to the fields.37 They receive two other small
meals per day: a bowl of soup for lunch and another bowl for dinner.38 At 9 p.m., the workers retreat to their shacks to sleep.39 The
next morning, the routine begins again.
29

Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1.
Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1.
31
Id.
32
Human Rights of Migrants Report, supra note 27 ¶ 89 (“The trip via the
freight train through Mexico is so dangerous that migrants . . . commonly refer to
it as ‘La Bestia’ or ‘The Death Train,’ because of the danger of falling from or
being run over by the train.”).
33
Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1 (“Earlier this year, 25 farmworkers walked 20 miles across a Baja California desert after a contractor left
them on the roadside, short of their destination.”).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1.
39
Id.
30
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Life on the Farm40
The difference between treatments of produce versus the treatments of workers on the farm is unmistakable. In order to ensure the
best harvest, farms conduct mandatory classes on proper picking and
require workers to keep their hands sanitized and fingernails
trimmed.41 The workers doing this work leave their families and
homes to live in shed-like rooms with concrete floors.42 They typically have no beds or other furniture and resort to sleeping on pieces
of cardboard.43 The workers in the camps share these rooms with
four to six strangers, using tarps as partitions.44 The quarters are often rat infested, and mothers must construct makeshift cribs out of
netting to protect their babies from scorpions.45 Women face the risk
of sexual assault or violence on a daily basis.46 Children work long
hours picking crops, such as short pepper plants, which are “perfectly suited to child pickers.”47 If the workers try to leave the camp,
they may be captured and beaten by the bosses or threatened with
death.48
Furthermore, wages are significantly less than required by Mexican federal labor law.49 Sometimes they are paid in the form of
vouchers redeemable only at the company store.50 The wage of 100
B.

40

To be clear, it would be presumptive to claim that these conditions persist
at every farm in Mexico. However, 15 out of 30 mega-farms surveyed in a recent
investigation were shown to use forced labor, while hundreds of small to mid-size
farms were shown to use child labor. See Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra
note 1; see also In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3.
41
Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3.
46
Human Rights of Migrants Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 209-1090.
47
In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3.
48
Id.
49
Salarios Mínimos Generales Por Área Geográfica, SECRETARÍA DEL
TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL, http://www.conasami.gob.mx/pdf/salario_minimo/2016/salarios_area_geo_2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
50
Greg Asbed, Massive Mexican Slavery Operation Underscores Need for
Market Consequences for Human Rights Violations, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1,
2013), www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-asbed/massive-mexican-slavery-o_b_352
8340.html.
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pesos a day that the labor contractor promised the workers is revealed to be obtainable only if certain quotas are met.51 For the elderly or young, these quotas are often impossible to meet.52 Additionally, when the harvesting season nears its end, workers at every
age struggle to make a decent wage.53 Wages are often illegally
withheld until the end of the farmworker’s contract in order to ensure that he or she does not leave without the entire crop field being
harvested.54 Without any money, the worker is often left indebted to
the farm’s store, which is usually the only place where they can purchase necessities such as water, toilet paper, and food.55 Because the
farm storeowners do not place price tags on any products, the storeowners are free to decide the price of the item, sometimes charging
double of what the stores in town charge.56
III.
SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTING LABOR RIGHTS
In order to best understand the impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the labor and human rights sector, it is necessary to first
analyze the existing law in these fields. Overall, the present treaties
and laws have been largely unhelpful to promote labor and human
rights in impoverished countries, such as Mexico, as a result of lack
of enforcement mechanisms. This section will analyze the current
international human rights laws, international labor laws, and then
the existing global trade law in order to obtain a background on the
importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

51
Richard Marosi, Desperate Workers on a Mexican Mega-Farm: “They
Treated Us Like Slaves,” LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://graphics.lat
imes.com/product-of-mexico-labor/.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1.
55
See Richard Marosi, Company Stores Trap Mexican Farmworkers in a Cycle of Debt, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://graphics.latimes.com/p
roduct-of-mexico-stores/.
56
Id.
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A.

International Human Rights Law
Following World War II, the international community began to
focus on upholding international human rights.57 In 1959, the Organization of American States (OAS) created the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to be the monitoring body
for human rights.58 The IACHR “is a principal and autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) whose mission
is to promote and protect human rights in the American hemisphere.”59 The IACHR works to further these ideals by examining
complaints or petitions regarding specific cases of human rights violations and then publishing reports on these cases.60 In addition, the
IACHR conducts visits to countries to investigate human rights violation allegations and makes recommendations to OAS memberstates regarding measures they should take to better protect human
rights.61
Mexico is also party to a number of human rights conventions,
such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families.62 However, human rights conventions largely rely on selfreporting and generally lack enforcement mechanisms. For instance,
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a ratifying party
must agree to “make the principles and provisions of the convention
widely known, by appropriate and active means.”63 This Convention

57

Yvonne M. Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties:
The Role of Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012).
58
What is the IACHR?, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http
://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See Ratification Status for Mexico, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/Treaty
BodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=112&Lang=EN (last visited Mar. 8,
2017).
63
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 42, Nov. 20,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
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also establishes a committee64 to which the parties will submit reports on measures they have taken to ensure the agreement is
adopted in their country.65 However, there is nothing in the provisions of this Convention that addresses what occurs if the parties fail
to report or fail to uphold the agreement’s standards.
Additionally, in 1981, Mexico ratified the American Convention
on Human Rights, which states that human rights include the rights
to humane treatment66 and freedom from slavery.67 This agreement
requires parties to adopt legislation necessary to uphold the agreement’s provisions.68 The American Convention on Human Rights
also established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.69 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights consists of seven elected
judges who have the power to rule that a country violated the American Convention on Human Rights.70 However, while the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights represents a promising instrument, there are few to no mechanisms to ensure that parties are upholding the judgment.71
Many human rights agreements simply reflect unfulfilled promises that countries make and often lack the requisite enforcement
mechanisms to rectify violations of human rights. Part of the reason
some countries ratify these treaties may be because they realize that
the cost of committing is low and the consequences of noncompliance are insignificant.72 Though some states may treat the minimal
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat, because of the multitude of countries that do not, many human rights conventions fall
short of their intended goals.

64

Id. at art. 43.
Id. at art. 44.
66
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
67
Id. at art. 6.
68
Id. at art. 2.
69
Id. at ch.VIII.
70
Id. at art. 52
71
Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in the Hemisphere: Casting Down
Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J.
243, 282 (2008).
72
Dutton, supra note 57, at 5.
65
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B. International Labor Law
International Labor Organization (ILO) is at the forefront of
workers’ rights. The ILO was founded in 1919 and seeks to give an
equal voice to workers, to promote rights at work, and to enhance
social protection.73 The ILO has founded a number of conventions
since its inception, including the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention74 and Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture) Convention.75 Mexico ratified the former on June 1, 1959 and the latter on
November 1, 1937.76 These conventions reiterate the ILO’s labor
rights77 and include mechanisms for handling complaints against
parties.78 However, like the human rights agreements, the ILO has
no sanctioning power or any other mechanism for enforcing its
standards.79 Instead, violations of ILO conventions may only be
remedied through party-to-party dialogue, embarrassing publicity,
or other forms of social responsibility and moral forces to persuade
the party-violator to rectify the situation.80
Much like human rights law, international labor laws lack sufficient enforcement mechanisms to bind parties to the agreements.
The ILO wholly relies on “the power of persistent persuasion and
the mobilization of shame against governments that fail to live up to
73

About the ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.
ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
74
See International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labor Convention 1957, Jan. 17, 1959, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=10
00:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C105.
75
See International Labour Organization, Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921, Feb. 26, 1923, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/no
rmlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C012.
76
Ratifications for Mexico, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_CO
UNTRY_ID:102764 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
77
See generally International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labor Convention 1957, Preamble, Jan. 17, 1959, available at http://www.ilo.org/d
yn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C105; see generally; International Labour Organization, Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture)
Convention, 1921, Preamble, Feb. 26, 1923, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C012.
78
Applying and Promoting International Labour, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-int
ernational-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
79
Compa, supra note 8, at 160.
80
Id.
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the obligations they have voluntarily undertaken.”81 Because of the
ILO’s lack of sanctioning power, labor laws may be most effective
when coupled with trade laws, as discussed below.
C. Global Trade Law
Global trade law provides regulations and customs for trade between countries. Historically, international trade agreements left out
provisions governing labor rights or human rights.82 Thus, trade law
and human rights or labor rights were in distinct spheres. Developing countries especially resisted linkage because of the comparative
advantage that they have in cheap labor and production.83
Currently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only
global international organization dealing with trade between nations.84 The WTO’s formal institution was the result of an overhaul
of an international agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), and was established on January 1, 1995.85 It is composed of 164 country-members, including Mexico.86 The WTO is a
negotiating forum and provides a place for member-governments to
sort out trade disputes.87
For purposes of this paper, the most relevant agreement within
the WTO is the Agriculture Agreement.88 This agreement allows
81

James Mercury & Bryan Schwartz, Article, Creating the Free Trade Area
of the Americas: Linking Labour, the Environment, and Human Rights to the
FTAA, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 37, 46 (2001) (citing J.M. Vogelson,
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report the
House of Delegates, 30 INT’L LAW 653, 660 (1996)).
82
Thomas Cottier & Alexandra Caplazi, Labour Standards and World Trade
Law: Interfacing Legitimate Concerns 17, available at http://www.humanrights.
ch/upload/pdf/000303_cottier_caplazi.pdf (“It would seem that arguments against
linking trade and social standards have prevailed so far.”).
83
Id.
84
What is the WTO? , WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
85
What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015).
86
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.w
to.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
87
What is the WTO?, supra note 84.
88
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
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governments to support their agricultural economies while improving market access and export subsidies.89 The objective of the agreement is to create a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.90 To do so, the agreement requires a reduction of the volume
of, and expenditures on, subsidized exports.91 Additionally, the
agreement requires the countries to reduce trade-distorting domestic
subsidies.92 Notably, however, the Agriculture Agreement does not
offer any labor protections for agricultural workers.
In the event of a dispute rising from the Agreement, a membergovernment may file a complaint against another member-government. Under the WTO’s dispute resolution procedures, which include the establishment of a tribunal-like panel, dispute resolutions
should occur within one year and three months of the initial complaint.93 However, no sanction or recommendation is binding upon
the violating country.94 The only potential mechanism for enforcement under the WTO is for the complaining country to raise import
duties (“within certain limits”),95 which can only be done after WTO
authorization and only for a “reasonable period of time.”96 Additionally, because the WTO addresses trade issues rather than labor, this
loose enforcement mechanism cannot be applied to violations of any
labor law or international labor agreement.
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NAFTA AND THE
TPP

A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.97
These three countries negotiated this agreement in an effort to improve free trade by eliminating barriers to trade and promoting conditions of fair competition.98 For the United States, the impetus for
NAFTA began in 1984 after the passing of the Trade and Tariff Act
under President Ronald Reagan.99 This Act grants the President the
power to negotiate free trade agreements.100 It also restricts Congress’ power to change negotiating points in agreements and instead
only permits final congressional approval or disapproval.101 Five
years after the Trade and Tariff Act was passed, the United States
and Canada entered into the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,102
which was the first agreement in North America to establish free
trade between two nations through the “elimination of barriers to
trade in goods and services.”103 Four years after entering into this
agreement, however, NAFTA effectively suspended the Canadian
agreement.104 President George H.W. Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992 and it entered into force on
January 1, 1994.105 Trade among the NAFTA countries has tripled
97
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since the agreement’s signing106 and has thus substantially expanded
Mexican trade.107 However, the trade agreement itself, as almost all
trade agreements at this time did, failed to provide provisions that
would protect labor rights. Instead, labor rights are addressed in the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a corollary to NAFTA.108
a. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
The NAALC was proposed by the United States109 in order to
substantiate NAFTA’s initial goal to “protect, enhance and enforce
basic workers’ rights.”110 Public attention concerning the lack of labor provisions in NAFTA materialized during the campaign of President Bill Clinton, who agreed to go further with NAFTA only if
parallel accords on labor rights were negotiated with Mexico and
Canada.111 The negotiations for the NAALC began on March 17,
1993 in Washington D.C.112 Interestingly, during these negotiations,
Mexico adamantly refused to classify labor standards as “obligations” and proposed that they instead be considered “objectives.”113
This was because Mexican leaders believed that a country should
not be required to “harmonize their labor standards to [sic] those of
another country.”114 Though this could have been a warning to the
United States and Canada that Mexico was not prepared to uphold
labor rights, after about five more months of negotiations, the three
countries signed the agreement on September 14, 1993115 and it entered into force on January 1, 1994.116
106
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The NAALC, as a labor side-agreement, was the first of its
kind.117 The purpose of the NAALC is to “improve working conditions and living standards in each Party’s territory.”118 However, this
general goal did not include specifications as to how to meet it. For
instance, the NAALC did not set a minimum wage by which the
parties had to abide. Instead, it broadly provided that “each Party
shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor
standards”119 and that “[e]ach Party shall promote compliance
with . . . its labor law.”120 This broad requirement provided little
guidance as to what a country needed to do in order to abide by the
NAALC. Another goal of the NAALC is to “promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex 1.”121
Annex 1’s guiding labor principles consist of:
1.
Freedom of association and protection of the
right to organize
2.

The right to bargain collectively

3.

The right to strike

4.

Prohibition of forced labor

5.
sons

Labor protections for children and young per-

6.

Minimum employment standards

7.

Elimination of employment discrimination

8.

Equal pay for women and men

9.
Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses

117
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10.
Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses
11.

Protection of migrant workers122

In order to ensure that these labor principles are promoted, the
parties agreed to each establish a National Administrative Office
(NAO) that would serve as a point of contact between the national
governments.123 Each NAO is charged with bringing labor complaints to the NAALC’s Commission on Labor Cooperation and has
the duty to review the labor laws in each country to evaluate whether
a party has failed to comply with its obligations under the
NAALC.124
b. Dispute Resolution under the NAALC
Dispute resolution under the NAALC is extremely complex and
burdensome, mostly because of the Agreement’s complicated categorization of the above eleven labor principles.125 The NAALC divides the principles into three groups: (1) Principles 1, 2, and 3; 126
(2) Principles 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11;127 and (3) Principles 5, 6, and 9. 128
Out of the three groups, this paper will only address Groups 2 and
3. Specifically, when comparing the NAALC to the TPP, this paper
will cover violations of the prohibition of forced labor, labor protections of children and young persons, and minimum employment
standards, as these issues represent the largest reported problems occurring on Mexican farms. Under all three groups, however, in the
event of an alleged violation, the NAALC allows parties to talk with
one another and to “establish consensual work programs to address
the problem.” 129
122
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Beyond these permitted discussions, the NAALC treats alleged
violations differently based on which group the violation falls under.
For instance, a violation of a principle in Group 1 is not subjected to
an independent review procedure. 130 Thus, if the United States
wanted to bring a claim against Mexico for violating workers’ right
to collectively bargain, the United States’ only option to address this
grievance would be to establish discussions and possible work programs with Mexico in order to resolve the dispute. On the other
hand, the NAALC gives alleging parties more options to address a
violation of a principle in Group 2. In the event of a violation of any
of the principles in this group, the NAALC permits a grievance to
go to an Evaluation Committee of Experts,131 further discussed below. Finally, the NAALC allows the most intervention for an allegation of a violation of any of the principles in Group 3. Under this
group, alleging parties are able to initiate discussions, to take their
grievance to an Evaluation Committee of Experts, or to bring the
complaint to an arbitral panel.132 If a violation of a principle in
Group 3 is found, the violating party may also face sanctions.133
However, violations of principles in Groups 1 and 2 are not subjected to these sanctions and countries are not permitted to bring the
complaint to an arbitral panel.
c. Post-Consultation Dispute Resolution for Groups 2 and 3
If a dispute is not resolved through the initial permitted consultations discussed above, a party may then request the establishment
of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).134 The ECE is comprised of three individuals with expertise in labor matters and who
are prohibited from taking instructions from any party.135 Within
120 days after it is established, the ECE must present a draft report
of the dispute.136 This report contains an assessment of the dispute,

130
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the ECE’s conclusions, and practical recommendations when appropriate.137 Then, 60 days after this draft report, the ECE must present
a final report to the NAALC’s Commission on Labor Cooperation.138 Importantly, the ECE can only conduct assessments and investigations of the issues and make recommendations. None of these
recommendations are binding on a party.
After the ECE process, if the dispute involves a violation of any
of the principles listed in Group 3, a Party may request another consultation with the other Party, but only if there “has been a persistent
pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce such
standards.”139 Within 60 days of this request, if the Parties fail to
resolve the issue, a Party may then request a special session with the
Commission on Labor Cooperation, which will seek advice from
technical advisors and then attempt to mediate and make recommendations.140
If this third attempt of reconciliation does not resolve the issue
within 60 days, the Commission on Labor Cooperation may then
establish an arbitral panel (“the Panel”) after a two-thirds vote of the
Parties.141 The Panel is to consist of 45 willing individuals who have
expertise in labor law, dispute resolution under international agreements, or other relevant professional experience.142 Within 180 days
after the last panelist is selected,143 the Panel must present findings
of fact and its determination as to whether there has been a persistent
pattern of failure to the disputing parties, with a final report being
presented within 60 days of the initial report.144 If the complainedagainst Party fails to implement the plan presented by the Panel, the
panel may impose a fine.145 If the Party further fails to pay this assessment, the Panel may suspend the Party’s NAFTA benefits, but
only “in order to collect what is necessary to pay the assessment.”146
137
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This lengthy and complicated process allows about 1225 days from
the initial complaint to a formal sanction for noncompliance.147
Though nongovernmental actors (NGOs) are permitted to bring
a complaint to a government, the NAALC leaves the government
with the sole right to raise the complaint internationally.148 Notably,
no complaint filed through the NAALC has advanced beyond the
initial consultation level.149 Though the NAALC requires that domestic labor laws be enforced, Mexico maintains a “hands-off” approach to enforcement of these laws.150 Additionally, there has been
little effort on the part of the United States and Canada to verify
accusations of lack of enforcement.151 Of the three cases that were
brought under the NAALC against Mexico, not one went further
than the Ministerial Consultation stages and the government parties
simply established reach-out programs to “resolve” the issues.152
Though the agreement was unprecedented in terms of a trade
agreement with labor provisions, the NAALC has largely failed in
its goal to protect labor rights. There are a few possible reasons for
this failure. One reason could be that the dispute resolution procedures are so lengthy and complicated that would-be complaining
parties simply do not have the time or patience to figure out the system and keep the complaint alive. Another possibility is that the
United States and Canada have turned a blind eye to Mexico’s violations in fear of retaliation or political discourse between the countries. Third, the NAALC may fall short simply because reports of
violations fail to thoroughly address the issues and do not provide
enough information to justify an assessment of sanctions against a
country. Finally, and perhaps the most pessimistically, the NAALC
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may have failed because the United States and Canada simply refrain from bringing complaints because they have feel that they have
nothing to gain from enforcing the labor rights of Mexican workers.
B. Trans-Pacific Partnership
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a recently negotiated
treaty that aims to improve international trade between the United
States and eleven other Pacific Rim nations, including Mexico.153
Though newly elected U.S. President Trump withdrew from the
treaty, the remaining countries have continued discussions.154 The
TPP’s thirty chapters address state-owned enterprises, intellectual
property protection, environmental protection, and protection of labor rights.155 In terms of labor rights, the TPP’s purpose is to protect
workers and to promote transparency in negotiations between countries.156
The precursor to the TPP was a 2002 tripartite agreement between New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore and later joined by Brunei
Darussalam in 2005.157 In February 2008, the United States joined
the negotiations in order to improve trade relationships with Pacific
Rim countries.158 Seven countries were later invited: Australia,
Peru, and Vietnam in 2008, Malaysia in 2010, Canada and Mexico
in 2012, and finally Japan in 2013.159 Notably excluded from the
negotiations was China, though the country remains a leader in international trade.160
153
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The TPP aims to protect labor rights, while improving working
conditions, and to strengthen cooperation between the Parties on labor issues.161 Article 19 of the TPP requires all Parties to adopt and
maintain the fundamental labor rights as recognized by the ILO. 162
Article 19.3 states that these labor rights consist of:
(a) Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b)The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c)The effective abolition of child labour, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour and other labour protections for children and minors;
(d)The elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation; and
(e)Acceptable conditions of work with respect to
minimum wages, hours, of work, and occupational
safety and health.163
Not only must Parties adopt and maintain laws in order to ensure
that these rights are protected,164 they must also promote public
awareness of their labor laws and compliance procedures. 165 Furthermore, Parties are forbidden from weakening protections given
in each Party’s labor laws in order to encourage trade.166 To hold
Parties accountable, the TPP also requires other Parties to discourage the importation of goods from sources using forced or compulsory labor.167
While the TPP, like NAFTA, only allows claims to be brought
by countries, it does require each country to ensure that individuals
have the ability to address their grievances within their respective
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
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countries. Article 19.8 requires each Party to allow an individual
with standing to have access to an “impartial and independent tribunal for the enforcement of the Party’s labour laws.”168 These proceedings must be fair, adhere to due process, and give access to remedies in the event that they are needed.169 However, these proceedings only affect a country’s labor rights and not their obligations to
the other party-countries of the TPP.
To monitor whether labor rights are being upheld within each
country, the TPP established a Labour Council.170 The Labour
Council is composed of senior government officials, chosen by each
Party, and is required to meet every two years.171 The Labour Council’s duties involve discussing issues of mutual interest, facilitating
public participation and awareness of the implementation of Chapter
19, and overseeing the general work program.172 The Labour Council is also required to work with what the TPP established as “Contact Points” of each country.173 These Contact Points are offices or
individual officials, designated by each Party, who facilitate communication between the Parties and assist and report to the Labour
Council.174 The Contact Points also act as a means for communication with their respective country’s public and have the power to
“develop and implement specific cooperative activities bilaterally or
plurilaterally.”175
a. Dispute Resolution under the TPP
As with the NAALC, cooperation between the TPP Parties is
necessary to implement and enforce labor standards.176 Additionally, like the initial dispute resolution mechanisms in the NAALC,
Parties may deliver a written request to the other Party’s Contact
Point in order to initiate discussions concerning an alleged violation.177 If the issue is resolved during these discussions, the Parties
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
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document the outcome and make a report of it available to the public.178
However, if the issue fails to be resolved, the Parties are permitted to engage in labor consultations.179 It is unclear exactly how
these consultations would differ from the initial discussions, other
than the requirement that labor consultation procedure must follow
a specific timeline and that other Parties are informed of these consultations. To initiate a labor consultation, the requesting Party must
include specific information that allows the responding Party to reply, and then must distribute the labor consultation request to the
other Parties’ Contact Points.180 The responding Party then must reply no more than a week later and distribute its response to the other
Contact Points.181
Parties must begin labor consultations no later than 30 days after
this response.182 In these consultations, the Parties must provide
enough information to allow an examination of the issue in its entirety.183 To accomplish this, either Party may request independent
experts or may request the presence of the other Party’s government
officials or agencies with expertise in the matter.184 After examining
the issue, the Parties must “make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter.”185 In the event that they
do not resolve the issue through these formal consultations, the Parties are able to turn to formal “Dispute Settlement,” given in Article
28 of the TPP.186 However, the formal Dispute Settlement process
is only available if the Parties were unable to resolve the issue within
60 days after the date of receipt of the initial request.187 This is an
interesting requirement because it seems as though a Party could
simply procrastinate on the labor consultations in order to avoid going through a formal Dispute Settlement.
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Regardless, under Dispute Settlement procedures, the complaining-Party may request the creation of a panel, consisting of three
people, in order to fully address the failed issue at hand.188 When
this occurs, both Parties must appoint a panelist within 20 days and
agree on an appointment for a panel chair within 35 days.189 These
panelists must be objectively chosen, must be independent of any
Party, must have expertise in the law or the resolution of disputes,
and must comply with a laid out code of conduct.190
The panel’s purpose is to objectively assess the matter and make
findings and recommendations for the resolution of the dispute,191
using past WTO reports as persuasive, but not binding, precedent.192
The panel must hold an initial hearing, which must be available to
the public, and file an initial report no later than 150 days after the
final panelist is appointed.193 This report must include findings and
determinations, as well as the reasoning thereof.194 No later than 30
days after this initial report, the panel must present a final report to
the Parties, which must be released to the public within 15 days after
receiving the final report.195
Finally, this final report must be implemented within a “reasonable time,” which the TPP states is no later than 15 months from
receipt of the final report, though the Parties may agree on a shorter
or longer time depending on the circumstances.196 In the event that
the responding Party fails to implement the terms of the final report’s recommendations within 30 days, the complaining Party is
authorized to use “trade retaliation” (suspension of benefits or payment of a monetary assessment).197 The suspension should entail the
same subject matter that was in dispute, but may entail different subject matter in the event that the grievance is severe enough.198 However, though these foreign sanctions can be imposed, “nothing in the
188
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Agreement can require the United States or other Parties to change
a law or regulation” domestically.199
C. Comparing NAALC and the TPP
The Obama Administration argued that the TPP was a significant improvement on NAFTA200 and agreed that, “[p]ast trade
agreements haven’t always lived up to the hype.”201 Though the
NAALC helped to bring attention to labor rights by being the first
trade agreement to include labor provisions,202 it inevitably proved
to be inefficient because of its lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.203 Another shortcoming of the NAALC is its over-reliance
on governmental action.204 As discussed below, this does not seem
to be completely alleviated by the TPP. In concluding this, it is necessary to first analyze how the protections of labor rights differ under each agreement, and whether the enforcement mechanisms of
the TPP will be more successful in protecting those rights.
a. Forced Labor and Child Labor
Both Annex 1 of the NAALC205 and Article 19 of the TPP206
prohibit forced labor. However, they differ as to their protections of
child labor. The NAALC states that each party must have “labor
protections” for children and young persons as one of the standard
labor principles, which are simply “guiding principles” and do not
“establish common minimum standards for their domestic laws.” 207
199
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The TPP, on the other hand, provides for the abolition of child labor,208 rather than simply child labor “protections.” The specific requirement for parties to maintain regulations that effectively abolish
child labor in the TPP, rather than simply stating that the country
must protect against child labor as the NAALC does, helps to clarify
the obligations of the signing parties.
Additionally, in regard to forced labor and child labor, though
the NAALC only requires countries to enforce their own existing
labor laws,209 the TPP commits all parties involved to the ILO’s
standards on labor and requires them to adopt laws in adherence to
ILO’s fundamental labor rights.210 Furthermore, unlike the NAALC,
the TPP specifically forbids weakening protections to drive down
prices and therefore encourage trade amongst the countries.211 Finally, the TPP furthers these workers’ rights by requiring parties to
commit to discourage importation of goods that are produced by
forced labor or child labor.212 This requirement holds all parties accountable in eliminating child or forced labor.
b. Minimum Employment Standards
Both Annex 1 of the NAALC213 and Article 19 of the TPP214
protect minimum employment standards for workers, including
minimum wage and overtime pay. However, only the TPP requires
the parties to establish regulations concerning hours of work,215
while the NAALC simply leaves those standards to be bargained for
under the protection of the labor principle of the right of workers to
bargain collectively.216 This important difference places responsibility on the party, rather than placing the burden on workers to fight
for minimum standards, because it requires the party to adopt new
208
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regulations in the event that those minimum standards are not being
effectively enforced. This is important because, though Mexico already has laws in place that govern these issues, the system is in dire
need of reform or at the very least, implementation. To combat this,
the United States’ commentary to the TPP stated that Mexico’s plan
to implement a new system is forthcoming, an agreement that is discussed further below.217 This commitment to address already-present issues is wholly absent from the NAALC.
c. Dispute Resolution
The clarity of the TPP’s dispute resolution mechanisms likewise
improves upon the NAALC’s provisions. While the NAALC provides complicated tiers and different procedures to bring a dispute
under each tier,218 the TPP provides the same mechanisms to resolve
any labor dispute under Article 19.219 As discussed above, dispute
resolution must be completed within 37 days of an initial complaint220 or, if the parties choose to invoke Article 28, the process
must be completed within 215 days.221 This timeline is a significant
improvement on the 1225-day dispute resolution procedure that may
occur under the NAALC timeline.222
While the NAALC relies on country parties themselves to resolve a dispute,223 the TPP provides an independent tribunal, in the
form of a panel, which is available if parties are unable to settle disputes.224 This independent tribunal consists of three panelists who
must have expertise in “law, international trade, other matters covered by this agreement, or the resolution of disputes arising under
217
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international trade agreements.”225 The panelists must also be independent of, and not affiliated with, any party, and chosen “strictly
on the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment.”226 The
existence of an objective third party to settle disputes is critical to
ensuring that complaints are properly dealt with and that sanctions
or recommendations further the purpose of the TPP.227 Under the
NAALC, countries had little to no outside pressure to resolve disputes and were dissuaded to enforce the Agreement lest the complained-against Party filed a retaliatory action against the complaining-Party.228 Under the TPP, however, many more countries are
party to the agreement, and thus it is possible that there may therefore be more pressure amongst the parties to uphold the agreement.
Additionally, the most noticeable difference between the TPP and
the NAALC is that, under the TPP, countries may now enforce trade
sanctions against one another in the event of a violation of the labor
provisions.
Finally, all written dialogues, labor consultations, and Panel decisions must be made available to the public under the TPP.229 This
allows interested members of the public to have access to records of
how their country handles a dispute, or what, if any, action they take
against a party in clear violation of the Agreement’s labor provisions. This requirement furthers transparency and accountability, as
public awareness places outside pressure on the Party.230
D. Does One Agreement Supersede the Other?
Because Mexico and the United States are parties to NAFTA
and, assuming Mexico and the United States may be parties to the
TPP or to a substantially similar agreement, it is imperative to analyze whether such an agreement will supersede NAFTA and thus the
NAALC. If not, countries that are party to both treaties would be
inclined to treaty shop depending on which agreement’s dispute
mechanisms would result in a more favorable outcome.
225
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The United States’ commentary to the Article specifically states
that the TPP’s labor chapter will “broaden or improve upon
NAFTA.”231 Article 1 of the TPP addresses concerns of overlapping
agreements.232 The Agreement provides that, in the event of a discrepancy between agreements, Parties must request consultations
with another Party to discuss the inconsistency and attempt to reach
a “mutual satisfactory solution.”233 This solution would likely be a
mutual decision determining under which treaty the parties agree to
seek dispute resolution.
However, a footnote in Article 1.2 explicitly states, “[f]or purposes of application of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the fact
that an agreement provides more favourable treatment of . . . persons than that provided for under this Agreement does not mean that
there is an inconsistency within the meaning of paragraph 2.”234 This
means that even if the TPP provides more stringent standards in
terms of labor rights than NAFTA/NAALC, or another treaty that
Mexico is party to, Mexico and a complaining-Party are under no
obligation to discuss the inconsistency between the agreements and
do not have to attempt to reach a mutual satisfactory solution.
This issue is addressed later in the TPP Article 28. Under the
TPP’s Choice of Forum provision, the Parties agree that in the event
a dispute arises under both the TPP and under another international
trade agreement (such as NAFTA), the complaining Party chooses
which forum to use to settle the dispute.235 Additionally, the Article
provides that once the complaining Party chooses the forum and
once they have requested the establishment of a panel, “the forum
selected shall be used to the exclusion of other fora.”236 Thus, while
the TPP will not effectively supersede NAFTA or the NAALC,
Mexico must still implement the labor standards outlined in the TPP
and, if a dispute arises, a Party may choose TPP over NAFTA and
the NAALC (or another agreement) to resolve the issue. Because the
TPP has stricter labor standards, it is likely that a Party would choose
the TPP over NAFTA. Additionally, the complainant-Party will
231
232
233
234
235
236
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likely choose the TPP because of its stronger method of recourse to
resolve the issue through more methodical dispute resolution procedures.
E. Will the TPP Effectuate Change?
Trade agreements in the past have ultimately failed at protecting
labor rights,237 and complaints relating to labor rights have rarely
been filed.238 The main issue for Mexican farmworkers is that Mexico does have rather strong labor laws, yet they have rarely been
enforced.239 Article 123 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution contains
a compilation of workers’ rights. 240 This Article was codified as
federal law in 1931 and has been supplemented by an extensive labor decree, the Mexican Federal Labor Law of 1970.241 Rights
granted to workers through Article 123 include maximum work
schedules of six eight-hour workdays per week for blue-collar workers.242 Additionally, the Article establishes that the minimum age to
work is sixteen-years-old.243 These provisions fit within the labor
standards required by both the NAALC and the TPP. However,
though the NAALC’s purpose was to help protect these rights, the
Agreement was ineffective in fulfilling this goal—mostly as a result
of its onerous enforcement provisions and its inability to impose effective sanctions.244 Between the NAALC’s entry into force, only
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40 complaints have been filed between 1994 and 2015,245 with 24
being directly filed against Mexico; however, no case has ever
passed beyond Ministerial Consultations.246 Though the NAALC requires Mexico to enforce its own labor laws, the requirement has
failed to be effectively enforced, mostly due to lack of reporting on
labor violations based on “the traditional weakness of Mexican unions and the nature of the average Mexican worker.”247 Most Mexican farmworkers have come from disadvantaged regions and are
largely ignorant of their rights and the labor laws in the country.248
Like the NAALC, the TPP’s labor provisions only allows for
actions to be brought by Parties, meaning States. While this is typical for labor agreements, it is clearly not enough. As stated above, a
glaring shortcoming of the NAALC was the over-reliance on governmental action, which would also be the case for the TPP without
an avenue for individuals or NGOs to bring claims. Frustratingly,
while the TPP does not allow outside organizations to bring labor
claims, it does allow outside organizations to bring intellectual property claims. Under Article 18 of the TPP, investors are permitted to
bring disputes under intellectual property rights. Companies and investors will be permitted to challenge regulations and government
actions through a TPP claim—without any governmental intervention to bring the suit.249 The question remains as to why investors
have the option to bring a TPP claim, yet labor organizations, such
as AFL-CIO, and farmworkers, are unable to. It seems as though
investors get real relief, while workers must depend on the good
graces of a government.
To be sure, however, the signing of the TPP will not transform
the nature of the average Mexican farmworker nor will they automatically become informed of their labor rights and begin to demand
them. Indeed, though these rights were loosely addressed through
245
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NAFTA, the number of children employed in child labor still had
the slowest rate of decline in the Latin and Central American regions
while NAFTA was in force.250 It is clear then that NAFTA fell short
of its goal to eliminate child labor, though it should be noted that
Mexico is but one country in the aforementioned region. However,
the TPP does seem to improve upon the faulty framework of the
NAALC and is, if nothing more, a step in the right direction for
Mexican farmworkers. This is evidenced by the differing standards,
accountability requirements, and enforcement procedures of the
TPP. For instance, not only is Mexico required to maintain the ILO’s
labor rights within its own laws, other Parties are now required to
hold the country accountable if it fails to do so. Each Party to the
TPP is required to discourage importation of goods from Mexico
that are produced through forced labor or child labor, “through initiatives it considers appropriate.”251 It remains to be seen whether
countries will do this at the expense of having to then import likely
more expensive goods; however, the transparency provisions of the
TPP may induce outside pressure from the Party’s constituents. Under the TPP, Parties are now required to allow the public to submit
grievances regarding labor rights.252 Once a Party receives such a
submission, the Party must make the submission, and the results of
its considerations, public.253 These transparency and accountability
mechanisms do provide hope that Parties will uphold their responsibilities and obligations under the TPP.
Additionally, while sanctions for violating NAALC obligations
have failed to be effective,254 the TPP’s ability to effectuate change
through possible trade sanctions provides a more concrete method
of enforcing TPP obligations. This ability of the TPP is unprecedented for Mexico in regard to labor rights and allows a direct hit on
a violating country’s economy. 255
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Finally, and perhaps the most promising, was the purported establishment of a bilateral implementation plan between the United
States and Mexico to ensure labor reform and cooperation thereof.256
As stated above, because U.S. President Trump withdrew from the
TPP, the below bilateral plans serve as an example of how trade
agreements could affect labor in regions that direly need a change.
This implementation plan would have been subject to the same dispute resolution mechanisms that the rest of the Agreement entails,
including possible trade sanctions.257 Mexico’s plan was said to follow the commitments that the United States had already made with
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The already-negotiated
plans with those countries included allowing independent unions
and requiring the countries to enforce prohibitions on forced labor.258 Essentially, the plans required these countries, which either
lack labor laws or lack effective enforcement mechanisms, to implement or revise laws to rectify the issues. These changes were to have
been made before the countries were allowed to export goods dutyfree to the United States.259 Additionally, the plans gave the United
States the right to “withhold or suspend tariff reductions” for the
country in the event that the country did not comply with the agreement within five years.260
Mexico’s plan was purported to reform “its system for protecting collective bargaining and union representation rights.”261 Additionally, if Mexico’s plan followed that of the aforementioned countries, implementation of this plan will enable the United States to
monitor and report on the progress of Mexico’s reform and withhold
256
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tariff reductions in the event that it was not successful.262 In regard
to the current issues occurring on Mexican farms, the surveillance
of the United States in ensuring that Mexico implements the provisions of the TPP seemed to be promising. If the Mexican plan had
modeled the Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam plans, the
Mexican government would have been required to enforce its existing laws on minimum working age requirements and maximum
work schedules. Additionally, as discussed further below, the TPP,
through this plan, would have given workers the protection they
need to establish effective unions. This would give the workers a
platform to shed light on the atrocities that they face on the farms.
While these plans seemed promising, the question remains as to
whether they would have been abided by and, if not, whether the
United States would have done anything about it. Interestingly, the
United States recently faced a similar issue in 2014. Stemming from
an allegation that Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its own
labor laws, on August 9, 2011, the United States requested the establishment of an arbitral panel under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).263
The two countries agreed to suspend the implementation of the arbitral panel pending negotiations of and implementation of an Enforcement Plan (similar to the above-discussed plans).264 The plan
was signed in April 2013.265 However, because Guatemala had still
not met the requirements of the Enforcement Plan seventeen months
later, the United States chose to proceed with the dispute settlement
process.266 This case marked the first and only time the United States
has brought a case against another country for a labor violation under a free trade agreement.267
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In sum, the problem does not rest with the TPP. The provisions
of the Agreement are the strictest that Mexico has ever been party
to and the dispute resolution mechanisms provide a more methodical
and time-sensitive manner to address labor violations. However, the
problem largely rests with party-countries that fail to enforce agreements. While this problem will likely remain, the recent case against
Guatemala provides hope that the United States is ready to begin
enforcing provisions of their labor agreements. Hopefully then, under the TPP, the United States or other party-countries will feel prepared to enforce possible violations against Mexico.
V. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
While the TPP sets a higher bar for labor rights than other free
trade agreements have, it is naïve to believe that the new agreement
will completely resolve the outstanding labor issues occurring on
Mexican farms. Though there is likely no end-all solution, utilizing
a bottom-up approach would help generate outside pressure from
consumers (the demand side of business), unions, and individual
workers (the supply side of business) on the Mexican government
and the farm-owners.268 A bottom-up approach utilizes education of
workers and consumers to place pressure on the suppliers and government and could aid in enforcing Mexico’s new obligations under
the TPP by holding the country accountable for its agreements.
Generating Pressure from the “Supply Side”
As previously explained, many, if not all, of the workers on
Mexican farms come from impoverished regions and are largely uneducated. Unfortunately, this leaves the enforcement of workers’ labor rights in the hands on the farm-owners or the government. The
farm-owners have little reason to ask their employees to work fewer
hours (in order to meet the maximum hours worked law) or to increase their employees’ wages (as doing so would decrease the
amount of money going to the owner himself). Additionally, until
the Mexican government agrees to an implementation plan with the
United States under the TPP, it is unlikely that they will begin to
enforce their labor laws because they have not done so previously.
268

Oliver, supra note 202, at 230, n. 267.

2017]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

135

Thus, in order to institute this bottom-up approach, it is imperative
that the workers become educated and form unions and NGOs to
push for their rights.
This is not out of reach for Mexican farm workers. For instance,
in June of 2015, a group of farmworkers organized a strike in Baja
California that resulted in wage increases of up to 50% as well as
the securing of government-required benefits.269 The strike, initiated
in part by labor leaders who had experience with farm labor unions
in the United States, lasted for about three months and caused about
$80 million in losses to the industry.270 Though somewhat successful, many workers remain frustrated with the system.271 Continuing
to ensure that labor standards are upheld, and fighting for labor
rights beyond minimum wage and benefits, will require further persistence and determination on the part of the workers.
As one example on the effectiveness of determination within
worker education and unions, in the wake of a similar situation that
the Baja California workers faced, a group of workers in Florida
collectively formed a NGO, called the Coalition of Immokalee
Workers (CIW) in 1993.272 At that time, wages of workers on Florida’s tomato fields were declining and forced labor was the norm.273
After discussing what could be done to implement change, the workers effectuated “three community-wide work stoppages with intense
public pressure- including an unprecedented month-long hunger
strike” by 1998.274 Notably, this organization was formed through
the dedication of the workers themselves and had no intervention or
help from the government or legal system in its inception.275 Additionally, as a result of this pressure on Florida farm owners, the CIW
secured raises of 13-25% across the industry and obtained political
and social awareness and respect.276 As of 2015, the CIW has
269
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worked with food giants such as Taco Bell, Burger King, and
Chipotle, all of which have agreed to abide by the CIW’s standards,
including “improv[ing] wages and working conditions for Florida
tomato pickers in its supply chains.”277
Additionally, the CIW has created the Fair Food Program,
“which uses farmworkers’ legal rights as a baseline and then establishes crucial additional protections . . . .”278 Through this program,
the CIW provides critical worker-to-worker education that educates
farmworkers of their rights.279 The CIW also provides a 24-hour
complaint line and complaint investigation and resolution process,
giving the workers a protected way to file complaints before the issue escalates.280 Additionally, under the Fair Food Program, farms
are subjected to independent audits in order to ensure that the farms
are complying with the Program’s standards.281 Finally, as further
discussed below, the Fair Food Program is able to provide “enforcement through market consequences,” holding the farm directly accountable for their actions.282
Ideally, new provisions in the TPP will help to provide these
Mexican farmworkers with the ability to form these unions or
NGOs. Notably, the purported main goal of the implementation plan
was to develop reforms concerning its system for protecting collective bargaining and union representation rights.283 Additionally, the
TPP requires countries to promote public awareness of its labor
laws.284 Knowing that they have the capability to exercise their
rights could give farmworkers the power they need to form a NGO.
This NGO could mirror the CIW and further aid in implementing
change across the farms. If the farmworkers were to model the CIW,
as they seem to be beginning to do with the help of farmworkers
previously working in the United States, there could be enough pressure, by these NGOs, on the government to effectuate change.
277
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A cross-border alliance would not be unprecedented. For instance, in 1994, Mexico’s Authentic Labor Front and the United
States-based United Electrical, Radio, and Machinist Workers
(“UE”) joined forces to file a petition to the United States government, in order to pressure the United States to file a claim against
Mexico.285 While this petition was ultimately deemed insufficient to
substantiate a claim that Mexico was violating NAFTA, it showed
the power of NGOs to influence the government to initiate claims.
These cross-border alliances are important, however, because Mexican farmworkers cannot bring a claim against Mexico and because
it is unlikely that they would be large enough or persuasive enough
to pressure another country to bring a claim against Mexico. Similar
to the UE petition, a cross-border alliance may have the scope and
effectiveness to pressure a country, such as the United States, to file
a claim against Mexico under the stricter TPP standards.
Unfortunately, farmworkers would be starting on a much worse
footing than the farmworkers who started CIW. While the CIW was
established in response to wage and working hour issues, a Mexican
NGO would be responding to repeat and egregious child labor,
forced labor, and deplorable working conditions. Additionally,
though they have been done before, cross-border alliances are an
optimistic, and rather unlikely, hope for farmworkers because the
workers are restricted to remaining in their camps when these violations are occurring. Realistically, Mexican laborers have many obstacles to overcome before a farmworker NGO would be large
enough and powerful enough to join with a United States NGO—let
alone to effectuate change. However, if successful, this bottom-up
approach on the supply-side leaves the Mexican government pressured to protect its export economy and thus to respond to the labor
violations—a huge step in the right direction for the protection of
the workers’ rights.
Generating Pressure from the “Demand Side”
In order to support the farmworkers protesting on the supplyside, consumers must continue demanding their food coming from
285
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Mexico be ethically sourced—something that began to occur as a
result of June’s strike.286 Consumer-driven enforcement mechanisms demand socially responsible products and help to present “labor rights as human rights.”287 A main element of the consumerdriven model is the assumption that consumers will pay extra for
decent working conditions.288 A survey conducted by the National
Bureau of Economic Research found that consumers were willing to
pay more for goods produced under decent working conditions and
that they would require a steep discount in order to buy products
produced in poor conditions.289 With enough consumer demand,
producers have to would race to the top to compete with other companies for public favor and consumer money.290
Awareness of the exploitation of these workers should invoke
strong reactions within consumers, and thus elicit strong demand,
once they are educated on the horrific conditions occurring at the
farms they purchase food from. This awareness would not spread by
the TPP, but rather through exposés of the conditions, such as the
aforementioned investigation conducted by Richard Marosi of the
Los Angeles Times.291 This revolution will come slowly, but organizations have already been formed in the United States with the aim
of educating consumers on what exactly it takes to produce their
produce. For instance, as described above, the Fair Food Program
has promoted awareness of farm conditions across the United States.
Similar organizations such as Fair Trade USA292 have been instrumental in educating consumers and workers alike about farmworkers’ labor rights.293 As a third-party auditor of farms, Fair Trade
286
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USA’s core values include ensuring a democratically run farm, fair
working conditions (including a strict prohibition of forced and
child labor), and sustainable wages.294 Once a product is approved
by the organization, a sticker is placed on the product for consumers
to see that it has met the program’s standards. This program utilizes
consumer awareness and a demand-side approach to affecting the
decisions on companies regarding where to purchase their goods
from and strives to bring about “a social movement that brings
strength, hope and real choice to the world’s consumers.”295 Whenever a consumer purchases a product with a label such as this, the
consumer is effectively using his buying power to “vote in favor of
socially responsible production.”296 These third-party auditors are
critical, because promises from companies and retailers to purchase
products from ethical sources have largely fallen short without any
third party watching over them.297
The main issues with this approach are a possible lack of consistency and a question of effectiveness.298 Because these labels and
information systems are given by the private sector, it is often difficult for a consumer to know whether the information is based on
independent evaluation or rather on a specific manufacturer’s subjective claim.299 Additionally, the necessity of an individual evaluation of each company wishing to be labeled as socially responsible
is a costly endeavor for the evaluator. This requires both consumer
awareness and consumer demand to remain high enough to prefer
products produced under decent conditions to such a degree that the
consumer remains willing to pay a higher cost for the product.300 In
the event of a collapse of consumer demand for these ethically
sourced goods, it would be necessary to reevaluate how to ensure
that goods are being produced through socially responsible means.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
The violations of labor rights occurring on Mexican farms, some
of which export to American corporations, represent an egregious
treatment of workers in a country that is party to numerous free
trade, labor, and human rights agreements. The presence of forced
labor, child labor, and utter lack of enforced minimum employment
standards stands in clear violation of the ILO’s fundamental labor
rights. Until the recent TPP, however, many of those agreements
lacked provisions on labor rights and, when they did, they lacked
sufficient enforcement mechanisms. These agreements therefore ultimately failed to protect workers. The newly negotiated TPP, on the
other hand, binds Mexico to adhere to the fundamental labor rights
outlined in the TPP. With the power of other parties to now enforce
trade sanctions upon the country, it is likely that this agreement will
effectuate at least part of the labor revolution that is so needed in
Mexico.
In regard to the labor provisions and dispute resolution mechanisms stated in the TPP, the twelve countries established an unprecedented agreement that aims to protect vulnerable workers in all
party-countries. While it remains to be seen whether the consultations and dispute resolution procedures will be used or will even
work, the new agreement certainly reflects movement towards a
more just treatment of Mexican farmworkers. Even if the TPP fails
to be ratified in every country, the agreement sets a new precedent
for future agreements to include fully enforceable labor provisions.
Finally, outside pressure on governments is critical to ensuring
that countries are fulfilling their commitments. Thus, implementing
change will be most successful when mixing the TPP’s new guidelines with a bottom-up approach, from both workers and consumers,
placing pressure on the Mexican government and food corporations
alike. This worker-driven and consumer-driven enforcement, when
paralleled with a free trade agreement that includes stronger labor
protection such as the TPP, will result in an undeniable pressure
upon the government and farm-owners to establish new protocols
for dealing with labor rights in the country.

